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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Labor Law
LABOR LAW - ATTORNEY'S FEES - AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
INTERVENOR IN ACTION BY SECRETARY OF LABOR ENFORCING TITLE IV
of the LMRDA IS WARRANTED BY COMMON BENEFIT EXCEPTION.
Brennan v. United Steelworkers of America (1977)
On February 13, 1973 the United Steel Workers of America (USWA) held
an election for the position of district director of District 31.1 Edward
Sadlowski was defeated by Samuel Evett, the hand picked successor to the
district's long-time director. 2 Amid reports of massive irregularities,
3
Sadlowski retained counsel to aid him in protesting the election.4 Having
first exhausted his internal union remedies 5 in accordance with the
requirements of the USWA constitution, 6 Sadlowski filed a timely complaint
with the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), pursuant to section 402(a) of Title
IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA).7 After an investigation, the Secretary instituted suit in federal
court seeking to void the election.8 Sadlowski's motion to intervene as a
plaintiff was granted.9 After extensive pretrial proceedings, in which
Sadlowski's counsel played an active role, 10 the district court approved a
1. Brennan v. United Steelworkers of America, 554 F.2d 586,590 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3645 (Apr. 18, 1978). District 31, with approximately 300 locals and
130,000 members in Illinois and Indiana, is the largest district in the union. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. During the three-day period for tabulation of the votes, Sadlowski received




6. See id. at 590 n.4. The USWA constitution provides in pertinent part:
Sec. 18. All contests in connection with the votes of any Local Union must be
filed with the International Tellers not later than ten (10) days after the date of
election, by a member of the Local Union whose vote is contested.
Sec. 21. All contests growing out of the report of the International Tellers
shall be filed with the International Executive Boards not later than ten (10)
days following the mailing of the report to the Local Unions and candidates. The
International Executive Board shall decide all such contests prior to June 1, of
the election year.
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF USWA CONST. art V, §§ 18, 21. After the election of Evett
was upheld by the Tellers, Sadlowski appealed to the USWA Executive Board, which
sustained the Tellers' report. 554 F.2d at 590.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970); see 554 F.2d at 590. Section 402 provides in pertinent
part: "A member of a labor organization ... may file a complaint with the Secretary
within one calendar month ... alleging the violation of any provision of section 481
of this title . . . " 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970).
8. See 554 F.2d at 590. The suit was filed in the district court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania. The district court opinion is unreported. See id.
9. See id.
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settlement agreement directing that a new election be held. 1 Sadlowski was
victorious in the new election. 12 The district court denied Sadlowski's
subsequent application for attorney's fees, granting USWA's motion to
dismiss. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"
reversed, holding that an award of attorney's fees to a party who has
intervened in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor under Title IV of
the LMRDA is consistent with the purposes of that title and may be justified
under the "common benefit" exception to the traditional American rule,
which disfavors the award of attorney's fees in the absence of statutory or
contractual authorization. Brennan v. United Steelworkers of America, 554
F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3645 (Apr. 18, 1978).
The traditional American rule prohibited the award of attorney's fees to
the litigant successful in bringing a common law cause of action.' 5 A major
judicially created exception 6 to the American rule was the "common fund"
exception, which recognized the power of a court to award attorney's fees to
a plaintiff whose suit created, increased, or protected a fund in which others
were entitled to share.17 The "common fund" exception was extended to
11. See 554 F.2d at 590-91. The settlement agreement directing that a new
election be held on November 19, 1974, was approved on August 23, 1974. See id.
12. Id. at 591. An order and decree based upon the Secretary's certification of the
election results was entered on December 2, 1974. Id.
13. See id. 589. The court of appeals stated that
[t]he district court held that a defeated candidate for union office who intervenes
in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor to avoid an election is precluded
by the statute from recovering an award of attorneys' fees against the union, and
that even if there is no statutory preclusion such an intervenor may not recover
attorneys' fees under the "common benefit" doctrine for his actions in
complaining to the Secretary, participating in litigation, shaping a settlement,
and helping to police a rerun election.
Id. (footnote omitted).
14. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Van Dusen and Aldisert, and District
Judge Brotman, sitting by designation. Judge Van Dusen wrote the majority opinion
to which Judge Aldisert dissented.
15. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 420, 427 (1975).
For a discussion of this general rule and traditional exceptions, see Comment, The
Changing American Rule Against Attorney Fee Shifting: Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co. and Hall v. Cole, 28 Sw. L.J. 542, 542-44 (1974).
16. There are also statutory provisions contrary to the general American rule.
See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970); Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
17. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). In Trustees, the plaintiff
succeeded in securing large payments to bondholders of the Florida Railroad
Company from the trustees of more than ten-million acres of state owned land in
Florida which had been conveyed to the trustees as security for a company bond issue.
Id. at 528-29. The trustees had collusively sold hundreds of thousands of acres while
failing to provide reserves for payment of interest and principal on the bonds. Id. The
United States Supreme Court reasoned that failure to award attorney's fees to the
successful plaintiff, who by his litigation creates a fund which benefits others, would
give an unfair advantage to others entitled to participate in the fund. Id. at 532.
The crucial fact in "common fund" cases has been success, since only the
successful litigant benefits the other parties, justifying a fee award from the common
fund. See Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567 (1886); Central R.R.& Banking Co. v. Pettus,
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include suits which created no fund, but which would operate by stare
decisis to entitle others to recover out of the same assets.' 8 State courts relied
on the relaxation of the fund requirement to create the "substantial benefit"
test, which permitted the award of attorney's fees in cases where the result
served to correct or prevent an abuse prejudicial to the rights of others. 19
These exceptions to the general rule barring award of attorney's fees
also were applied to a claimant successful in bringing a statutory cause of
action.2° Absent evidence of congressional intent to deny an award of
attorney's fees, the lack of a statutory provision authorizing fee awards did
not preclude the exercise of a court's power to fashion such relief.21 However,
the trend toward liberal awards of attorney's fees22 was limited by the
United States Supreme Court in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co. 23 The Fleischmann Court ruled that attorney's fees were not
recoverable where the statute created the cause of action and provided a
"meticulously detailed" remedial scheme. 24
18. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). In Sprague, the
plaintiff brought an action to segregate a fund deposited in trust in a bank which
became insolvent. Id. at 162-63. The Supreme Court recognized the power in the
district court to reimburse plaintiffs litigation expenses even though she sued on her
own behalf and not for a class, because her success would, by operation of stare
decisis, entitle others to recover out of the same assets. Id. at 167-69. See Steinberg v.
Hardy, 93 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn. 1950); Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 55 F.
Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
19. See, e.g., Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949);
Bosch v. Meeker Co-operative Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423
(1960). The Abrams court held that law enforcement was a sufficient benefit to justify
a fee award where a stockholder sued in the corporation's behalf to restrain its
commitment to an ultra vires act. 97 N.Y.S.2d at 499. Restraint was deemed to be a
protection of, and beneficial to the corporation, its stockholders, and creditors. Id. at
495. In Bosch, the plaintiff prosecuted a derivative action against certain directors
and counsel of defendant corporation. 257 Minn. at 363, 101 N.W.2d at 425. The action
resulted in a determination that a purported election of directors and a proposed
amendment to the corporate bylaws were illegal. Id. The Supreme Court of Minnesota
held that law enforcement would be a substantial benefit to the corporation where the
action protects the interests of the corporation. Id. at 366-67, 101 N.W.2d at 426-27.
20. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). In Smolowe,
stockholders sued their corporation and several of its directors under § 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), and recovered for
defendant corporation profits realized by the directors from security trading. 136 F.2d
at 234. Several sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 specifically provide for
recovery of attorney's fees, but § 16(b) does not mention fees. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that specific provisions in some sections do not
evidence congressional intent to deny courts the power to award fees under other
statutory sections. Id. at 241. See Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708
(7th Cir. 1941); A. Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 204 F.
Supp. 374 (D. Del. 1962).
21. Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943). For a discussion of
Smolowe, see note 20 supra.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. 386 U.S. 714 (1967). In Fleischmann, the plaintiff sought to recover attorney's
fees for an infringment of his trademark rights under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1976). 386 U.S. at 714-15.
24. 386 U.S. at 719-20. The court stated:
The recognized exceptions to the general rule were not . . . developed in the
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Subsequent to Fleischmann, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,25 the
Supreme Court applied the "substantial benefit" test to a shareholder's
judicially implied cause of action brought derivatively and on behalf of a
class of minority shareholders under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Act of 1934).26 The Court granted the plaintiff an interim award of
attorney's fees,27 concluding that the vindication of statutory policy
constituted a "common benefit" to the corporation and its shareholders.28
The Mills Court indicated that the Act of 1934 lacked the meticulously
detailed remedies that were provided by the statute at issue in Fleisch-
mann.29 The Court also determined that the express provisions in certain
sections of the Act of 1934 for the recovery of attorney's fees 3° "should not be
read as denying to the courts the power to award counsel fees in suits under
other sections of the Act."
31
The Supreme Court extended Mills to an express statutory cause of
action in Hall v. Cole.32 In Hall, a union member, expelled because his
criticism of union policies violated a union rule, brought suit under Title I of
the LMRDA 33 claiming that his expulsion from the union violated his right
of free speech guaranteed by section 102 of Title 1.34 The Supreme Court
ordered his reinstatement to the union, vindicated his right of free speech,
and awarded him attorney's fees, 35 reasoning that by enforcing the law and
intricate remedies.... When a cause of action has been created by statute
which expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other
remedies should not readily be implied.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). In Mills, the plaintiff brought a derivative action on
behalf of minority shareholders as a class to set aside a merger of their company. Id.
at 377-78. The proxy solicitations for the merger by Auto-Lite's management were
materially misleading in violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). 396 U.S. at 380.
26. 396 U.S. at 395. The Court recognized that "an increasing number of lower
courts have acknowledged that a corporation may receive a 'substantial benefit' from
a derivative suit, justifying an award of counsel fees, regardless of whether the benefit
is pecuniary in nature." Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the "substantial
benefit" test in state courts, see note 19 and accompanying text supra.
27. 396 U.S. at 389-90.
28. Id. at 395. The Court stated:
In many suits under § 14(a) ... it may be impossible to assign monetary value to
the benefit. Nevertheless, the stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair
and informed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the
statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the
corporation and its shareholders.
Id.
29. Id. at 391. For a discussion of Fleischmann, see notes 23 & 24 and
accompanying text supra.
30. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976).
31. 396 U.S. at 390. The Court cited Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir. 1943), as authority for this proposition. For a discussion of Smolowe, see note 20
supra.
32. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§411-415 (1970).
34. Id. § 412. See 412 U.S. at 3.
35. 412 U.S. at 3-4.
1977-1978]
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vindicating free speech, the plaintiff also vindicated the rights of all union
members and rendered a substantial benefit to his union as an entity and to
all its members.
36
Recently, the Supreme Court examined the "common benefit" exception
as applied through the "substantial benefit" test in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v.
Wilderness Society.37 The Alyeska Court observed that in prior Supreme
Court "common benefit" decisions, "the classes of beneficiaries were small
in number and easily identifiable. The benefits could be traced with some
accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that the costs could indeed be
shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting."
3 8
The LMRDA was enacted in response to congressional findings of
extensive corruption and improper fiscal and electoral practices by labor
unions.39 Title IV of the LMRDA establishes procedural safeguards for the
conduct of union elections and for the exercise of candidacy and voting
rights by union members.40 Enforcement responsibility is vested in the
Secretary of Labor,41 and an aggrieved union member may file a complaint
with the Secretary only after he or she has exhausted internal union
remedies. 42 The Secretary may then bring suit in federal district court.43 In
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers,4 4 the Supreme Court recognized a union
member's right of intervention in the Secretary's action. 45 The right of
36. Id. at 8.
37. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). The Alyeska decision involved a suit for attorney's fees
under the theory that the plaintiffs had performed the services of a "private attorney
general." Id. at 241. Although the suit did not involve the "common benefit"
exception, the Court examined its "common benefit" decisions in tracing the history
of the exceptions to the American rule. Id. at 257-61. The Court stated that "Congress
has not repudiated the judicially fashioned exceptions to the general rule against
allowing substantial attorneys' fees." Id. at 260. For examples of post-Alyeska
common benefit decisions, see National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d
317 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 555 (7th
Cir. 1975); Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975).
38. 421 U.S. at 265.
39. See Usery v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977), citing SENATE COMMrIrEE ON IMPROPER
AcTIvITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (First Interim Rep. 1958), and S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (Second
Interim Rep. 1959).
40. See 29 U.S.C. §§481-483 (1970).
41. See id. § 482(b). This section provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary shall ... bring a civil action against the labor organization as an
entity in the district court of the United States . . . to set aside the invalid
election, if any, and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote upon
the removal of officers under the supervision of the Secretary and in accordance
with the provisions of this subchapter and such rules and regulations as the
Secretary may prescribe.
Id.
42. See id. § 482(a).
43. See id. § 482(b). See also note 41 supra.
44. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
45. Id. at 537. In Trbovich, a union member sought to intervene in litigation
brought by the Secretary of Labor to set aside an election of union officers under Title
IV of the LMRDA. Id. at 529-30. The Court held that Title IV imposed no bar to
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intervention recognized by the Trbovich Court has given rise to subsequent
suits by intervenors to recover attorney's fees. 46 However, Title IV of the
LMRDA is silent regarding the availability of an attorney's fee award.
47
The issue of availability of an attorney's fee award under Title IV of the
LMRDA has been considered once before by a federal appellate court. In
Usery v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,48 the plaintiffs
were defeated candidates for union office who intervened in support of the
Secretary of Labor's suit under section 402(a) of the LMRDA. 49 After
summary judgment was granted in favor of the Secretary, a new election
was held which the intervenors lost.50 The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed the district court's denial of the
intervenor-plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorney's fees 51 reasoning
that the application of the "common benefit" rationale was appropriate
52
and that the statute did not preclude such an award.
53
The Brennan court began its analysis by considering whether Title IV
of the LMRDA precluded an award of attorney's fees.5 4 The court rejected
the union's argument that the absence of specific authorization to award
attorney's fees under Title IV precluded such an award,55 relying upon
Mills56 and Hall57 for the proposition that recovery under a statute that is
silent on the issue of attorney's fees is permissible unless remedies are
meticulously detailed, 58 or the legislative history shows an articulated
Court's discussion of the legislative history of Title IV showed that the reason why
the Senate chose exclusive administrative enforcement rather than private enforce-
ment was to eliminate frivolous complaints by union members and to consolidate
meritorious complaints into one suit. Id. at 536. The Court stated:
Legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended to prevent
members from pressing claims not thought meritorious by the Secretary, and
from litigating in forums or at times different from those chosen by the
Secretary. Only if intervention would frustrate either of those objectives can the
statute fairly be read to prohibit intervention as well as initiation of suits by
members.
Id. at 536.
46. See Brennan v. United Steelworkers of America, 554 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3645 (Apr. 18, 1978); Usery v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
47. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1970). See also Brennan v. United Steelworkers of
America, 554 F.2d 586, 591 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3645 (Apr. 18,
1978); Usery v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
48. 543 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir, 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
49. 543 F.2d at 373. For the text of § 402(a), see note 7 supra.
50. 543 F.2d at 375.
51. Id. at 388.
52. Id. at 383.
53. Id. at 388.
54. 554 F.2d at 591.
55. Id. at 592-93. The USWA relied on the holding in Fleischmann that a
comprehensive remedial scheme may bar an award of attorney's fees. See id. at 592.
The union asserted that Congress' rejection of a bill, which would have authorized
awards of attorney's fees and allowed private enforcement of Title IV, indicated
Congressional opposition to an award of attorney's fees. Id.
56. See notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
58. 554 F.2d at 592.
1977-1978]
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congressional opposition to such an award.59 The Third Circuit determined
that the remedial scheme created by Title IV of the LMRDA lacked the
meticulous detail necessary to find that the statute precluded attorney's fee
awards. 60 Furthermore, the court found no congressional opposition to such
relief.
61
Recognizing that, in Trbovich, the Supreme Court had expanded Title
IV of the LMRDA to permit union member intervention,62 the Third Circuit
next focused on "what relief a union member is entitled to after having
intervened in and participated in the prosecution of an action brought by the
Secretary under Title IV in the manner anticipated by the Supreme Court in
Trbovich.' '63 Outlining the role which Sadlowski and his counsel played in
this action,64 the court concluded that the Department of Labor relied almost
exclusively upon Sadlowski's charges in conducting its investigation and
that Sadlowski assumed the role of an adversary in developing the facts and
legal issues.65 The Brennan court found it unimaginable that the Supreme
Court intended to deny effect to the intervenor's role by rendering the courts
powerless to award fees.66 Thus the court concluded that "an award of
equitable relief is wholly consistent with Title IV of the LMRDA."67
59. Id. at 592-93.
60. Id. at 593. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra. The court reasoned
that the Supreme Court's expansion of Title IV in Trbovich indicated that the
remedial scheme was not so meticulously detailed as to require the application of the
Fleischmann rule. 554 F.2d at 593. See notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
61. 554 F.2d at 592-93. The Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's review of
the LMRDA's legislative history in Trbovich. Id. at 592. See 404 U.S. at 532-36. The
Brennan court reasoned that the absence of a provision for the possibility of private
assistance to the Secretary could not be interpreted as a purposeful limitation since
the legislative history of Title IV reveals that congressional debate focused upon
considerations of private enforcement versus administrative enforcement. 554 F.2d at
592.
62. See notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
63. 554 F.2d at 593-94 (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 594-98. Although enforcement of Title IV is vested in the Secretary of
Labor, the court found no congressional opposition to awarding attorney's fees to an
intervenor implicit in this scheme because the statutory framework embodies an
important role for the union members. Id. at 594-95. The court outlined the
importance of this role as follows:
[Qjuick action and skillful advocacy are probably most important at the initial
stages of the enforcement scheme, when infractions must be identified, a bill of
particulars formulated, the internal union procedures exhausted, and a
complaint drafted for presentation to the Secretary. Prompt, thorough, and
proper action in the earliest stages is essential to vindication of Title IV rights,
since preservation of all election defects is a prerequisite to government
intervention. ...
Since Trbovich, union members play an even more significant role in the
prosecution of Title IV violations, as intervenors.
Id.
The court discussed the role of Sadlowski's counsel extensively, delineating the
broad evidentiary investigation which Sadlowski's counsel undertook, as well as the
legal action taken in order to comply with the USWA constitution and to intervene in
the Secretary's action. Id. at 595-98.
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The final question addressed by the Brennan court was whether a
"common benefit ' 68 had been conferred on the union to justify a fee award.69
The court determined that the LMRDA "was intended to provide the union
members with protection from the type of attempts to thwart the wishes of
union members and impair union democracy which appear to have occurred
in this case." ° After tracing the history of the "common benefit" exception
to the American rule,71 the Third Circuit listed three criteria for evaluating
"common benefit" claims: "whether the benefits may be traced with some
accuracy; whether the class of beneficiaries is readily identifiable; and
whether there is a reasonable basis for confidence that the costs may be
shifted with some precision to those benefiting." 72 The Brennan court first
observed that the USWA benefited from Sadlowski's suit through the
vindication of union democracy.73 The court reasoned that the second
criteria was satisfied because the union membership, though large, was an
identifiable class.74 Finally, the court concluded that since the entire union
membership received a legally sufficient and significant benefit, attorney's
fees could justifiably be required to be paid from the USWA treasury.75 The
Third Circuit then remanded the case to the district court for determination
of "whether an award is warranted and, if so, the amount of such award.
'76
Judge Aldisert, in his dissent, pointed to the lack of explicit statutory
authorization for the award of attorney's fees as support for his finding that
the statute precluded such relief.7 7 The dissent also disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that a common benefit was conferred upon the entire
68. For a discussion of the "common benefit" exception, see notes 19-38 and
accompanying text supra.
69. 554 F.2d at 601.
70. Id. Since this appeal was before the Third Circuit on a motion to dismiss, the
allegations stated in the verified application for attorney's fees were accepted as true.
Id. at 604. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
71. 554 F.2d at 599-601.
72. Id. at 604-05.
73. Id. at 605. The court stated that "the determination and vigor of this union
member [Sadlowski] served to insure to all union members the rights which Congress
intended to be theirs, and in this instance union democracy would have been a hollow
promise without Sadlowski's involvement." Id. In addition, the court concluded that
the entire union membership was benefited by the fair election of a district director
because each director plays an important role on the International Executive Board,
representing all members of the union. Id. at 605-06.
74. Id. at 606. The court pointed out that "USWA members, though numerous, are
readily identifiable as the benefited group." Id.
75. Id. at 607. The Third Circuit noted that since there is no separate district
treasury, a requirement that attorney's fees must be recovered from a fund created by
those who received the greatest benefit would be tantamount to a denial of recovery,
and would create a loop-hole which could prevent future recovery. Id.
76. Id. at 608.
77. Id. at 611-15 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert reasoned that although
the other titles of the LMRDA provide for private enforcement and attorney's fees in
some cases, Title IV limits enforcement exclusively to the Secretary of Labor. Id. at
612 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). He concluded that since there is no express or implied
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union membership since the Supreme Court in Alyeska78 required that the
class of beneficiaries be small in number, the benefits be traceable with
some accuracy, and the costs shifted with some exactitude.79 Reasoning that
the benefits were directly traceable only to District 31, Judge Aldisert
concluded that costs were shifted disproportionately to the entire union
membership, which was only benefited indirectly, if at all.8
0
Although the contrast between the exclusive administrative enforce-
ment provision of Title IV81 and the private enforcement provisions of the
other titles of the LMRDA2 might indicate that a counsel fee award to a
private party is precluded by Title IV,83 it is submitted that this
interpretation overlooks the union member's right to participate in the
Secretary's action, which the Supreme Court recognized in Trbovich.8 4 Given
this judicially established right to participate, the requirement that the
Secretary initiate suit "does not negate the possibility of recognition of
benefit from the contribution of individual union members . . . to the
success and direction of the litigation journey."85
Furthermore, it is suggested that the Third Circuit was correct in
determining that Mills and Hall, rather than Fleischmann, were controlling
on the issue of statutory preclusion.86 The remedies provided in Title IV are
not so "meticulously detailed" as to preclude counsel fee awards under the
analysis in Fleischmann since, subsequent to the enactment of Title IV, the
Trbovich Court supplemented Title IV's enforcement scheme by permitting
union member intervention.
8 7
78. See notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
79. 554 F.2d at 614-15 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 38
supra.
80. 554 F.2d at 614-15 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert maintained that
the majority reached unwarranted legal conclusions when they assumed that
remedying illegal actions established a benefit. Id. He reasoned that accepting the
allegations as true for the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency of a claim does not
permit nonfactual conclusions to be drawn. Id. His objection was to both the
majority's characterization of USWA management and to the legal conclusion that
'illegal activities had taken place. Id. at 614 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert
also maintained that the majority rephrased the common benefit tests as delineated
in Alyeska because the facts in Brennan did not meet the precise Alyeska formulation
since the membership was too large and only District 31 was benefited directly. Id. at
614-15 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970). For the pertinent text of this section, see note 41
supra.
82. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 412, 464, 501(b) (1970).
83. See 554 F.2d at 612 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
84. See notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
85. Usery v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
86. See 554 F.2d at 592. For a discussion of these Supreme Court decisions, see
notes 23-36 and accompanying text supra.
87. 404 U.S. at 539. One court has also found an implied "waiver" procedure in
Title IV to afford time to negotiate settlements. See Hodgson v. International
Pressman, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971). In this case the
court held that the sixty day limit for filing suit under § 402(b) of the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. § 482(b) (1964), could be waived by agreement between the Secretary of Labor
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The Brennan court may be criticized for permitting an award of
attorney's fees despite the absence of the Alyeska requirement that the class
of beneficiaries be small.8 8 However, it is submitted that the crucial element
in prior "common benefit" cases has not been the size of the class, but rather
the conferral of a substantial benefit upon the entire class. 89 The benefit in
Brennan, which can be traced to each member of the USWA,90 was the
vindication of statutory policy 91 through the preservation of fair and
democratic elections. 92 The Mills decision confirmed that the vindication of
statutory policy carries with it a substantial benefit.93 Assurance of
statutory compliance benefits the entire union membership directly by
dispelling the threat of unfair and illegal elections in other districts.
94
88. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
89. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970). In deciding whether to award attorney's fees under the "common benefit"
exception, the Supreme Court did not mention the size of the benefited class in either
Mills or Hall. The Court in Mills characterized "common benefit" cases as those
which "permit reimbursement in cases where the litigation has conferred a
substantial benefit on members of an ascertainable class, and where the court's
jurisidction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that will
operate to spread the costs proportionately among them." 396 U.S. at 393-94. The
Hall Court stated that under the "common benefit" theory, "counsel fees are granted
... because the litigation confers substantial benefits on an ascertainable class of
beneficiaries." 412 U.S. at 15.
90. See 554 F.2d at 605. Judge Aldisert did not agree that benefits were traceable
to the entire union membership. Id. at 615 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). His assertion that
only the District 31 membership was benefited by the fair election of the District 31
director, overlooks the benefit of preservation of union democracy, which is directly
traceable to all union members through its assurance of individual rights. See id. at
605.
91. Many commentators have recognized the benefit conferred on an organization
which is forced to comply with the law. See, e.g., Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The
"Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658, 663 (1956)
(characterizes such suits as "therapeutic"); Comment, The Substantial Benefit Rule
Reexamined, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 164, 166 (1972) (discussion of vindication of statutory
policy as a substantial benefit); Comment, supra note 15, at 551. Note, Attorneys'
Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit" Sufficient to Award Fees from Third Party
Beneficiaries, 1972 WASH. L. Q. 271, 288 (redressing an organizational wrong confers
a benefit upon the organization).
92. See 554 F.2d at 605. In accepting the allegations as stated in the application
for attorney's fees as true, the court may have overstated the type of electoral abuse
which is alleged to have occurred by "noting the particularly egregious abuses" and
stating that "union democracy would have been a hollow promise without
Sadlowski's involvement." Id. It was unnecessary for the court to use such language,
since the common benefit was conferred simply by the union's violation of the
LMRDA. Id. However the Third Circuit did permit the district court, on remand, "to
take further evidence on common benefit and any surrounding circumstances if it
concludes that the record is not accurate." Id. at 608 n.16.
93. 396 U.S. at 395. See notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra.
94. The benefit involved in Brennan is analogous to that in Hall where the
United States Supreme Court stated:
[T]here can be no doubt that, by vindicating his own right of free speech
guaranteed by . .. Title I of the LMRDA, respondent necessarily rendered a
substantial service to his union as an institution and to all its members. ...
[B]y vindicating his own right, the successful litigant dispels the "chill" cast
upon the rights of others.
412 U.S. at 8. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
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It is submitted that the Brennan decision will result in more effective
enforcement of Title IV of the LMRDA since the cost of retaining counsel
will no longer have a prohibitive effect on the aggrieved individual's
willingness to allege violations. 95 In addition, "sound principle advises that
error is more likely to be exposed when intervenors are able to secure
competent counsel because of the prospect of recovering attorney's fees."
9 6
The additional cost of the intervenor's attorney's fees may also deter future
violations of the LMRDA.
97
The Brennan court did not recognize a new exception to the American
rule against the award of attorney's fees. Although the class benefited in
Brennan was larger than those in previous "common benefit" decisions, the
Third Circuit remained attentive to the Supreme Court's refusal to condone a
broad exception in Alyeska 98 by applying the criteria of the "common
benefit" exception in a logical manner.9 9 The award of attorney's fees to an
intervenor in Title IV cases should have a salutory effect upon union
elections, serving to encourage enforcement of the LMRDA, while having no
widespread impact on the traditional American rule.
Mary Ann Robinson
LABOR LAW - APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT - EXCLUSION OF
RELIGIOUS FACULTY FROM FACULTY BARGAINING UNIT IS ARBITRARY
ABSENT SHOWING OF SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN WAGES OR
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND LAY
FACULTY.
NLRB v. St. Francis College (1977)
On October 21, 1974, the St. Francis College Educational Association,
Pennsylvania Education Associate/NEA [the union] filed a representation
petition with the National Labor Relations Board [Board].' The proposed
95. See Hornstein, supra note 91, at 663. This author states that "every successful
suit duly rewarded encourages other suits to redress misconduct . . . ." Id.
96. Usery v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
97. In recognizing that the prevention of further abuses would be an outcome of a
decision to award fees, the Hall Court remarked: "Indeed to the extent that such
lawsuits contribute to the preservation of union democracy, they prove beneficial 'not
only in the immediate impact of the results achieved but in their implications for the
future conduct of the union's affairs."' 412 U.S. at 8-9, quoting Yablonski v. United
Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424, 431 (1972). See Horstein, supra note 91, at 663. This
commentator noted: "[T]he record of litigated cases is prophylactic - a deterrent to
future wrongdoing." Id.
98. Although the Alyeska Court affirmed the existence of the common benefit
exception to the American rule, they refused recognition to a broader exception - the
private attorney general concept. 421 U.S. at 269-71. See note 37 supra.
99. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
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bargaining unit was the faculty of St. Francis College, 2 excluding six
members of the faculty who were also members of the Franciscan Order. 3 At
the representation hearing, the Regional Director of the Board found that
the Franciscans were properly excluded 4 and directed a representation
election which the union won.5 The college refused to bargain and, in the
subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding, 6 the college challenged the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit and asserted that the exclusion of
the Franciscans violated their constitutional and civil rights.7 The Board
found the college guilty of unfair labor practices and issued a cease and
desist order which required the college to bargain with the union.
8 It
declined to reconsider any of the college's contentions that the Board
deemed to have been fully litigated in the representation hearing. 9 Following
the college's refusal to bargain, the Board petitioned for enforcement of its
2. St. Francis College, located in Loretto, Pennsylvania, was founded by the
Third Order of St. Francis over one hundred years ago. NLRB v. St. Francis College,
562 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 1977). In 1966, lay persons were elected to the college board
of trustees, and the Order and the college were separated into two distinct, nonprofit
entities. Id. The fiscal year 1973-74 saw the college's debts to the Order released in
exchange for property. Id. Also in that year, the policy of placing Franciscan teachers
under contract similar to those held by lay faculty was initiated. Id.
3. 562 F.2d at 249. While the Third Circuit made reference to the exclusion of six
full-time faculty members, the Board in its decision mentioned seven faculty members
whose exclusion was contested. Compare id. at 249 with 224 N.L.R.B. at 907.
4. 224 N.L.R.B. at 908. A union in its election petition to the Board must specify
what size unit it wishes to represent. If the employer or a competing organization
challenges the appropriateness of the unit, the parties may seek a representation
hearing before the Board to determine the appropriate group for the election of union
representation. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(a) (1970).
5. 224 N.L.R.B. at 908. The tally of ballots revealed thirty-three votes for the
union and thirty-one votes against. Id. at 908 n.4. The union was then duly certified as
collective bargaining representative. Id. at 909.
6. The union alleged violations of § 8(a)(1), (5) of the Act. Id. at 907. Section
8(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). Section 8(a)(5) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
7. 224 N.L.R.B. at 907. The college contended that the exclusion of Franciscans
violated 1) the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment to the
Constitution, 2) the equal protection guarantee of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, and 3) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)
(Supp. V 1975). 224 N.L.R.B. at 907. As amicus curia, the Pennsylvania Association of
Colleges and Universities argued that the Board should reconsider the exclusion of
the Franciscans from the bargaining unit and that the exclusion resulted in religious
discrimination in violation of Title VII, 224 N.L.R.B. at 908 n.6. The National
Catholic Educational Association also filed an amicus curia brief urging that the
exclusion constituted religious discrimination in violation of the first and fifth
amendments. Id.
8. 224 N.L.R.B. at 909-10.
9. Id. at 908. The Board stated that in absence of special circumstances or new
evidence the college was not entitled to relitigate issues that were or could have been
raised in a prior representation hearing. Id. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67(f), 102.69(c) (1977).
1977-1978]
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
order. 10 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit" denied
the Board's enforcement request, holding that the exclusion of the
Franciscan faculty was unreasonable and arbitrary, constituting an abuse
of discretion by the Board, and that the bargaining unit could not be upheld
as appropriate. NLRB v. St. Francis College, 562 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1977).
The National Labor Relations Act [Act] 12 was designed to promote
industrial peace through collective bargaining between employers and the
accredited representative of a unit of employees. 13 Section 9(b) of the Act
empowers the Board to determine appropriate units of employees for
collective bargaining purposes.14 Lacking definite statutory guidelines, the
Board attempts to unite into bargaining groups those employees who share
a "community of interest."'15 The policy behind such a determination is to
10. 562 F.2d at 246. To obtain judicial review of a Board's unit determination, an
employer must go through with the election and then refuse to bargain. Id. at 248 n.1.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(d), 160(f) (1970). This procedure has been described as"sufficiently exhausting and frequently technically obscure so as to serve as an...
obstacle to effective judicial supervision." R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 67 (1976).
11. The case was heard by Judges Aldisert, Rosenn and Hunter. Judge Hunter
wrote the majority opinion. Judge Rosenn concurred in a separate opinion.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970).
13. See id. § 151. The Findings and Policies statement within this section
provides: It is hereby declared to be the policy 6f the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment of other
mutual aid or protection.
Id.
14. Id. § 159(b). This section states:
"The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate
for the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof ...." Id. (emphasis added).
The jurisdiction of the Board "to make unit determinations is at the heart of
our system of collective bargaining ... for the size and makeup of a unit can have
significant consequences." R. GORMAN, supra note 10, at 67. The unit determination
may govern whether or not an election will take place, since a union must first
demonstrate a showing of interest. Id. The more diversified a constituency is, the more
likely conflicts of interests will result which strain the union's ability to represent all
employees fairly. Id. Also, numerous fragmented units may create chaotic labor
relations for the employer. Id. See also J. ABODEELY, THE NLRB AND THE
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT (1971); Grooms, The NLRB and Determination of the
Appropriate Unit: Need for a Workable Standard, 6 WM. & MARY L. REV. 13 (1965);
Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations, 58 MICH. L. REV. 313
(1960); Note, The Board and Section 9(c)(5): Multilocation and Single-Location
Bargaining Units in the Insurance and Retail Industries, 79 HARV. L. REV. 811 (1966).
15. See 93 CONG. REC. 6860 (1947) (Senator Taft's analysis of §-9(c)(5) of the Act).
The Board looks to the following factors in determining whether a community of
interest is present:
(1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings; (2) similarity in
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assure employees the fullest freedom in exercising their right to choose to
organize and bargain collectively.16 The Board does not have to select the
most suitable group of employees, but merely one that is "appropriate."'
1 7
The courts afford the Board wide discretion in choosing an appropriate unit
and will disturb the Board's decision on review only upon a showing of
arbitrariness.1 8
The Board's recent assertion of jurisdiction over private colleges 19 has
sparked a national movement toward unionization of faculties at the
university level. 20 The application of the Act to this academic context has
employment; (3) similarity in kind of work performed; (4) similarity in the
qualifications, skills and training of the employees; (5) frequency of contact or
interchange among the employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or
integration of production processes; (8) common supervision and determination
of labor-relations policy; (9) relationship to the administrative organization of
the employer; (10) history of collective bargaining; (11) desires of the affected
employees; (12) extent of union organization.
R. GORMAN, supra note 10, at 69.
16. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); Wil-Kil Pest Control Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 371, 375 (7th
Cir. 1971).
17. See Wil-Kil Pest Control Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB
v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1968).
18. The Supreme Court has stated that the determination of an appropriate unit
"involves of necessity a large measure of informed discretion, and the decision of the
Board, if not final is rarely to be disturbed." Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485, 491 (1947). When the Board acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary way, a
court will overturn its unit determination. See Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351,
356-57 (3d Cir. 1976).
19. In 1951, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over Columbia University,
concluding that although the effect on interstate commerce requirement of the Act
was met, jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations was intended "only in exceptional
circumstances and in connection with purely commercial activities." Trustees of
Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427 (1951), quoting H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (emphasis supplied by the Board). Nineteen years later, the Board
acknowledged the tremendous growth of educational institutions and the resultant
impact on interstate commerce and expressly overturned Columbia, asserting
jurisdiction over private colleges and universities. Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B.
329 (1970).
Soon after its Columbia decision, the Board promulgated rule 103.1 which
specifies:
The Board will assert its jurisdiction in any proceeding arising under sections 8,
9, 10 of the Act involving any private nonprofit college or university which has a
gross annual revenue from all sources (excluding only contributions which,
because of limitation by the grantor, are not available for use for operating
expenses) of not less than $1 million.
29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977). For a further discussion of the Board's assertion of
jurisdiction over private colleges and universities, see Kahn, The NLRB and Higher
Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A, L. REy.
63, 64 (1973); Menard, Exploding Representation Areas: Colleges and Universities, 17
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 931, 932-35 (1976); Menard & DiGiovanni, NLRB
Jurisdiction over Colleges and Universities: A Plea for Rulemaking, 16 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 599, 600-04 (1975); Moore, The Determination of Bargaining Units for College
Faculties, 37 U. Pirr. L. REV. 43 (1975); Comment, The Appropriate Faculty
Bargaining Unit in Private Colleges and Universities, 59 VA. L. REV. 492, 492-94
(1973).
20. See McHugh, Collective Bargaining With Professionals in Higher Education:
Problems in Unit Determination, 2 Wis. L. REV. 55, 55-57 (1971). For a discussion of
1977-19781
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posed special problems for the Board, for not only is a university's nonprofit
nature totally unlike the commercial sector with which the Board has
developed expertise, but a college faculty also differs in both structure and
motivation from the traditional bargaining unit.
21
Application of the Board's traditional community of interest criteria to
the college teaching world has raised a question as to the propriety of
including in bargaining units faculty members who were also members of a
religious order affiliated with the college. 22 In Seton Hill College,23 the Board
determined the appropriate bargaining unit to be the lay teachers on a
faculty composed of thirty-four lay teachers and fifty-eight Sisters of the
Order of Charity of Seton Hill on the ground that the Sisters did not share a
community of interest with the rest of the faculty.24 According to the Board,
the Sisters' membership in the Order that owned the school's grounds and
administered the college altered the employer-employee relationship making
the Sisters "in a sense part of the employer; ' 25 the Sisters' ties of allegiance
and obedience to the Order would place them in a position of conflicting
loyalties if allowed to join the bargaining unit.26 Furthermore, the Board
concluded that since the Sisters took a vow of poverty, they were not
interested in wages.
27
In two subsequent cases involving the exclusion of religious faculty
from a bargaining unit, the Board distinguished Seton Hill. In D'Youville
College,28 the Board included the religious faculty in the bargaining unit.
2 9
In the Board's view, the fact that no more than one-third of the college's
the impact of faculty collective bargaining on colleges and universities, see Benewitz,
Bargaining in Higher Education, 27 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 43 (1975).
21. See Kahn, supra note 19, at 66-68; Sands, The Role of Collective Bargaining
in Higher Education, 2 Wis. L. REv. 150, 163 (1971); Comment, supra note 19, at
494-95.
For a discussion of the Board's determination of college faculty units, see
generally authorities cited in note 19 supra.
22. The Board first addressed this issue in Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134
(1971). The Board in Fordham permitted the inclusion of seventy Jesuit faculty
members in the unit as requested by the petitioning union. Id. at 139. The Jesuits
received the same wages and were subject to the same practices and other conditions
of employment as the lay teachers, and no evidence was found that religious
membership was inconsistent with collective bargaining. Id.
23. 201 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1973). Without explanation Seton Hill overruled Fordham
to the extent of any inconsistency. Id. at 1027 n.4.
24. Id. at 1028.
25. Id. at 1027. Although the college was separately incorporated, the building
and grounds were owned by the Order of the Sisters of Charity of Seton Hill, and the
responsibility of administration lay in the trustees' hands, half of whom were Sisters.
Id. at 1026.
26. While the Sisters and lay teachers received the same salary and shared
identical work standards and obligations, the Board emphasized the fact that the
Sisters did not participate in life and medical insurance plans and that the Sisters,
unlike the lay teachers, were assigned to teaching positions by the Mother General of
the Order. Id. at 1027-28.
27. Id. at 1028.
28. 225 N.L.R.B. 792 (1976).
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trustees could be members of religious orders outweighed the nuns' vows of
poverty in a situation where there was no objection to the nuns' inclusion.
30
In Niagara University,31 the Board again included some religious faculty in
the bargaining unit where their link to the college's administration was too
indirect to support classification as "part of the employer." 32 The Board
minimized the importance of a vow of poverty, stating "that the way a
person chooses to spend his or her money is [not] a relevant consideration
with respect to questions of unit placement.
'33
Against this background of developing law, the Third Circuit began its
analysis by noting that the exclusion of the faculty members of the
Franciscan Order was neutral in terms of religion.34 Judge Hunter identified
the single issue before the court as the appropriateness of the bargaining
unit,35 thus avoiding the first amendment and religious discrimination
arguments.
36
After listing the factors considered by the Board in determining whether
a community of interest exists,37 the Third Circuit probed the extent of
religious ties between the college and the Franciscan Order. 38 The court
noted that salaries of the Franciscan faculty, who took vows of poverty,
were paid directly to their monastery, which in turn made voluntary gifts to
the college. 39 The St. Francis court also observed that in all respects
"concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment - the Franciscans
[were] treated the same as lay faculty members" 40 except for nonparticipa-
tion in the medical, pension and long-range salary continuation programs.
41
30. Id.
31. 94 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1976).
32. Id. at 1002.
33. Id. at 1003. The Board also noted that a religious faculty member's
"obligations under the vow of obedience are concerned with matters of religion and
not with the individual's professional conduct as a professor, or with their activities
with respect to labor or other professional organizations." Id. at 1002.
34. 562 F.2d at 248.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 255. The college made the same arguments that the Board had refused
to reconsider. Id. at 255 n.15. See note 7 supra.
37. 562 F.2d at 248-49. See note 15 supra.
38. 562 F.2d at 249-50.
39. Id. The court also noted that each Franciscan teacher had the right to receive
his paycheck but instead directed its delivery to the monastery which paid for its
members' living expenses and cared for old and needy Franciscans. Id.
40. Id. at 250.
41. Id. at 253. The court mentioned fringe benefits twice in its opinion; however,
when the court first mentioned fringe benefits, it identified only differences in terms
of participation in pension and medical insurance programs. Id. at 250.
1977-19781
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Judge Hunter next discussed the Board's decisions in Seton Hill,42
D'Youville43 and Niagara University44 and concluded that "there has
definitely been a shift in the Board's analysis of religious faculty members'
interests."45 After acknowledging "the wide discretion in the Board"
regarding the appropriateness of a unit determination, 46 the court addressed
two grounds that the Board advanced on appeal to justify its decision in St.
Francis.
47
The first ground, according to the Third Circuit, was "the special and
complex relationship between the Franciscan faculty and the college [which]
would present a conflict of loyalties for the Franciscans. ' 48 The court
rejected this contention, finding nothing in the record, despite the
Franciscans' vows of obedience and shared commitment, that indicated that
the Franciscan faculty differed from the lay faculty in terms of employer-
employee relationship.
49
The St. Francis court identified differing economic interests as the
second basis for the Board's decision.50 Judge Hunter noted that the salaries
received by the Franciscan faculty were identical to those of the lay faculty 51
and characterized the differences in fringe benefit arrangements as "very
42. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra. The college argued that, unlike
the situation in Seton Hill, it was a distinct entity with control vested in an
independent board of directors. 562 F.2d at 251. The college also attempted to
distinguish Seton Hill by noting that Franciscans desiring to teach had to apply
independently for faculty positions. Id. Furthermore, any donations made by the
monastery to the college were voluntary as opposed to contractual. Id. Finally, the
college contended that Seton Hill was undermined by D'Youville and Niagara
University. Id.
43. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit noted that
the Board had distinguished D'Youville College from Seton Hill because the college,
not the Order, owned the property and because the college restricted the number of
religious members on its board of trustees to one-third. 562 F.2d at 251. The Board also
considered it important that all parties involved wanted the Sisters included. Id.
44. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra. Niagara University was
distinguished because the religious faculty included in the bargaining unit belonged
to a different religious Province than the Province operating the university. 562 F.2d
at 251. Also, although the religious faculty turned their paychecks over to their orders,
they were directly concerned with their salaries because the excess over their expenses
went to support the orders' activities. Id.
The St. Francis court emphasized the Board's language in Niagara University
indicating that little significance should be attributed to vows of poverty and
obedience. Id. at 252. The Board had noted that any correlation between vows of
poverty and a reduced individual interest in income was beyond the Board's area of
expertise. Id.
45. 562 F.2d at 252.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 252-53. In its decision, the Board merely stated that under Seton Hill
the exclusion of the Franciscan faculty was valid. 224 N.L.R.B. at 907. On appeal, the
Board relied on two specific grounds to justify its decision. 562 F.2d at 252. See text
accompanying notes 48-54 infra.
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minor. 152 He emphatically rejected the argument that the Franciscans were
less interested in salary because they took vows of poverty. 53 Furfhermore,
the court questioned the relevance of an interest in wages in determining
bargaining units, stating that "[any conclusion that because employees
spend less on themselves, or have other sources of income, they are less
interested in their work income is sheer speculation.
' '54
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn listed the same two reasons as
the basis for the Board's order.55 Regarding the differences in salary and
fringe benefits, Judge Rosenn declared that it was unreasonable to assume
that religious persons who spend less money on themselves were therefore
less interested in their incomes. 56 In his view, "any exclusion of employees
from a bargaining unit that rests on the Board's estimate of the employees'
subjective interest in salary is per se unreasonable.
'57
In rejecting the second basis for the Board's decision, Judge Rosenn saw
nothing in the record to support the inference that a shared religious
identity between the religious faculty and the college administration would
result in a oneness of views that would compromise the employer-employee
relationship. 58 He cautioned, however, that in future cases religious faculty
members might be excluded from a faculty bargaining unit if the exclusion
were supported by the record.5 9
Although the Third Circuit focused on the traditional factors used by the
Board to determine if a "community of interest" exists among a group of
employees, 60 it is submitted that the court's characterization of the
Franciscan faculty's nonparticipation in medical, pension and long-range
salary continuation programs as "very minor"91 is subject to criticism.
Pension plans are a mandatory subject over which employers must bargain
with their employees' representatives. 62 Recently, labor unions have become
52. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the Franciscan faculty participated in a
short-range salary continuation plan, a tuition remission plan, a reciprocal tuition
arrangement, and sabbatical leave. They did not, however, participate in the medical,
pension, and long-range salary continuation programs. Id. See note 41 supra.
53. 562 F.2d at 254. A witness for the college characterized a Franciscan faculty
member's interest in salary on two levels: 1) as a matter of professional pride, and 2)
as an obligation to his community - the monastery and the Province. Id.
The St. Francis court dismissed without difficulty the Board's contention that
the Franciscan faculty members were paid less than their lay counterparts because
they turned their paychecks over to the monastery which returned approximately fifty
percent of their salaries to the college as gifts. Id. at 255.
54. Id. at 255.
55. Id. at 256. (Rosenn, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 257. (Rosenn, J., concurring).
58. Id. Judge Rosenn stated that "the nature of a religious commitment ... is too
complex to be explained by such factually unsupported assumptions." Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 248-49. See note 15 supra.
61. 562 F.2d at 253.
62. Under the Act, employers are required to bargain with employees' representa-
tives on "wages" and "other conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
This section provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
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more concerned with worker security as evidenced by the proliferation of
pension plans, medical insurance programs and welfare funds for retirement
in collective bargaining agreements.6 3 Since Franciscans do not participate
in these employment benefits, bargaining over these items may result in
disunity in a bargaining unit that includes both lay and religious teachers.
64
For this reason, it is suggested that, although these economic differences
should not be conclusive, they should be accorded greater weight in
appropriate unit determinations.
In rejecting the "special and complex relationship" between the
religious teachers and the college administrators as a ground for exclusion
from the bargaining unit,65 the St. Francis court left two questions
unanswered. First, although the court concluded that there was "nothing in
the record" that indicated that the Franciscan faculty differed "from the lay
faculty in terms of their employer-employee relationship, '66 it is not
apparent whether such evidence would ever be considered a valid basis for
exclusion. 6v Second, even if Judge Hunter agreed with Judge Rosenn that
"[W]e most certainly do not suggest that religious faculty members can
never be excluded from a faculty bargaining unit," 68 neither opinion gave
any indication of the type of evidence required to sustain such an
exclusion.
69
The analysis employed by the Board to exclude religious faculty
members from faculty bargaining units must be reexamined in light of the
Third Circuit's decision in St. Francis. Although Judge Rosenn admonished
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
Id.
The Board has determined that the term wages "must be construed to include
emoluments of value, like pension ... benefits, which may accrue to employees out of
their employment relationship." In re Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 4 (1947), aff'd,
170 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). The Board has also
concluded "that in any event a retirement and pension plan is included in 'conditions
of employment' and is a matter for collective bargaining." 77 N.L.R.B. at 7-8. See
Allied Mills, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949).
63. See BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, (BNA) 44:1, 48:1 (7th ed. 1971); R.
GORMAN, supra note 10, at 499; THE S.S. HUEBNER FOUNDATION FOR INSURANCE
EDUCATION, PENSIONS: PROBLEMS AND TRENDS 50 (1955).
64. Both Judge Hunter and the Board recognized that employment benefits are a
valid consideration in determining whether the necessary community of interest
exists among a group of employees. 562 F.2d at 259. See note 15 supra.
65. 562 F.2d at 253.
66. Id.
67. While Judge Hunter did not discuss the validity of such a basis, Judge Rosenn
speculated that it might constitute a legitimate ground if supported by the record. Id.
at 257 (Rosenn, J., concurring). See notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text supra.
68. 562 F.2d at 257 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
69. What the St. Francis court did do, however, was to adopt the reasoning of the
Board, expressed in Niagara University, that mutual vows of poverty and obedience
between religious faculty and administrators would alone not be sufficient to sustain
an exclusion of religious faculty members from a faculty bargaining unit. 562 F.2d at
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in his concurrence that the court decided only the case before it,7° crucial
points can be drawn from the majority opinion. Under the holding of Seton
Hill, there remain two somewhat restricted grounds upon which the Board
can legitimately prevent the inclusion of religious faculty in a bargaining
unit. First, there must be a direct and significant economic difference
separating religious and lay faculty. 71 Subsequent to St. Francis, this
inquiry may focus only upon whether equal benefits have been received by
all.7 2 Second, if the relationship between the faculty members and
administrators of the same religious order is such that a conflict of loyalties
might exist for the religious faculty members which would interfere with
normal employer-employee relations, the religious faculty may be validly
excluded. 73 Although it is not entirely clear whether the St. Francis court
would recognize this as a valid basis for exclusion, it is more likely that the
case will be interpreted as requiring the dissimilarity of interests between
the religious and lay teachers to be established by concrete evidence.
74
The Third Circuit has restricted the situations in which religious
teachers may be excluded by the Board from appropriate faculty bargaining
units. In the future, the Board's analysis may be further restricted. If the
Board excludes religious faculty under either ground open to it subsequent to
St. Francis it may still be confronted with the first amendment and religious
discrimination arguments not addressed by the Third Circuit.
75
Thomas C. Lowry
70. 562 F.2d at 257. (Rosenn, J., concurring).
71. It would appear that in determining a proper bargaining unit the clear-cut
case would be a distinction in terms of wages. See Nazareth Regional High School v.
NLRB, 549 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1977). If differences exist in the fringe or supplemental
benefit area, it presents a more difficult decision. See notes 61-64 and accompanying
text supra.
72. See notes 53-54 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 58-59 supra.
74. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
75. The allegation of religious discrimination raised on appeal in St. Francis must
be distinguished from instances in which religious discrimination arguments are used
to challenge the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over parochial elementary and
secondary schools. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, No. 76-1600 (7th Cir.
Jan. 21, 1977); Caulfield v. Hirsch & Ass'n of Catholic Teachers, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164
(E.D. Pa. 1977). In St. Francis, the Board's jurisdiction was not contested; rather,
religious discrimination was alleged in order to challenge specific actions by the
Board. See 562 F.2d at 255 n.15.
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